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The Shi’i Clergy and Perceived Opportunity Structures: Political 
Activism in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon  
 
During the last four decades, the Middle East has witnessed the rise of Shi’i 
political activism, through the direct engagement of clerical elites in socio-political 
arenas. With the re-emergence of activism on the part of Shi’i mujtahids and its 
impact on the ascent of Shi’i community in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, scholars have 
defined a distinct strategic difference between what they characterise as ‘quietist’ 
and ‘activist’ Shi’i mujtahids. This paper argues that this distinction is based on a 
misunderstanding of Shi’ doctrines and practices, and that, in the varying political 
contexts which arise in the Middle East, Shi’i mujtahids are always potentially 
active. It first introduces an analytical scheme for the study of Shi’i clerical 
political practices. It then uses this schema to explore recent Shi’i clerical political 
activism in the region.  
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For some time now, observers of ideological contentions in the Middle East have been 
drawn to the key role that political Islam has played in shaping these contentions. 
However, while much has been written about Sunni Islam doctrine, few studies have 
focused on the Shi’i community, especially the political activities of its clerical elite. 
Although, Shi’is constitute a minority within the Islamic community, they represent a 
majority of the population in the heart of the Middle East, in the strategic Persian Gulf 
sub-region.1 
The underlying core of political Shi’ism is derived from the two interrelated 
principles of the Imamate and the Occultation. The belief in Imamate rests mainly on the 
idea of the permanent necessity for a divinely guided persona, an Imam, to act as the 
authoritative leader of the community of the faithful in all matters. In fulfilling this, the 
imam represents ‘the legate successor of the Prophet [Mohammad]’ and is ‘infallible in 
                                                 
1 See Pew Research Center, ‘Mapping the Global Muslim Population’, Pew Research Center’s 
Forum on Religion & Public Life, (October 7, 2009), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/ (accessed June 
30, 2015). 
3 
 
all his acts and words’; thus, whoever obeys the imam is ‘a true believer,’ and whoever 
opposes or rejects him, ‘an infidel’.2 The Occultation belief in Shi’i Islam holds that the 
Twelfth Imam (the Mahdi) is alive but that he invisible to us for now and will re-appear 
at an unknown time and establish a ‘just Islamic order’. 
This is where the socio-political leadership of the clergy becomes central. Since 
the Occultation of the last Shi’i imam, qualified Shi’i mujtahids have acted as his general 
deputies, and they remain responsible for leading the community until the promised day 
of the re-emergence of the infallible imam.3 This doctrine implies that it is incumbent 
upon Shi’i mujtahids to protect the community from threats during this period of 
transition from Occultation to the re-emergence of the Mahdi, the twelfth Imam. The 
question here is, when does a high-ranking Shi’i mujtahid become politically active and 
when does he remain quiet?  
This paper first considers the notion of Shi’i ‘activism’ and ‘quietism’. It then 
develops the concept of political opportunity structure to clarify the context in which Shi’i 
mujtahids are able and willing to become politically active. Finally, it applies this 
argument to the Shi’i clerical elites in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. 
 
Shi’i Mujtahids’ Political Activism 
The term ‘Shi’i activism’ emerged in the early 1980s in the aftermath of the establishment 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Observers, attempting to understand the phenomenon of 
political Shi’ism, defined two different factions of clerics or Islamic doctrines: those 
                                                 
2 Wilfred Madelung, ‘His̲H̲Ām B. Al-Ḥakam’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 
497. 
3 This is the view of Usuli Shi’ism concerning the role of mujtahids during the Occultation Era. 
This paper focuses on those clerical elites who are proponents of this school of Shi’i Islam. Unless 
stated otherwise, the terms ‘clerical elite’, ‘the clergy’, ‘religious scholars’, ‘ulama’, and 
‘mujtahid’ refer to this category of clergy, which represents the majority of Shiʿi clerical elites in 
modern time. For a background on Usuli and Akhbari schools of thought in Shiʿi Islam see Juan 
Cole, ‘Shi’i clerics in Iraq and Iran, 1722-1780: the Akhbari-Usuli conflict reconsidered’, Iranian 
Studies 18, no. 1 (1985): 3–34. 
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characterised by quietism and those characterised by activism. However, as this section 
will argue, the distinction that has been defined between these two factions or doctrines 
is not doctrinal. Since the 1980s and the rise of the power of Iranian clerics, many scholars 
have attempted to apply this distinction to an understanding of what they assume to be 
Shi’i disillusion with the modern world. However, a review of the literature that invokes 
this distinction demonstrates that its use has caused further confusion, not only in attempts 
to explain political Shi’ism, but for understanding Middle East politics, more generally.  
One school of thought assumes that there is a fundamental difference between 
these two types of clerics or doctrines and has classified Shi’i mujtahids according to one 
or the other of them. These seemingly new Shi’i doctrines have been variously labelled 
as ‘quietism-activism’, 4  ‘quietism-revolutionary’, 5  ‘quietism-resistance’, 6  ‘silent-
speaking’,7  or ‘quietism-Islamism’.8  Within this dichotomy, quietism is viewed as a 
deliberate withdrawal from direct involvement in politics and, it is claimed, is mainly 
rooted in traditional Shi’ism.9 Proponents of this school, state that mujtahids generally 
believe that during the Occultation era, their main duty is to await the re-emergence of 
the imam, to stay quiet politically, and to avoid active confrontation with unjust rules. 
Therefore, for example, they label the mujtahids of Najaf seminary in Iraq, such as 
Ayatollah Khoei (1899-1992) and Ayatollah Sistani (b. 1930), as advocates of Shi’i 
quietism; while at the other spectrum of this dichotomy are clerics such as Ayatollah 
                                                 
4 Yitzhak Nakash, ‘The Shi'ites and the Future of Iraq’, Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (2003):17–26. 
5 Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). 
6 Christoph Marcinkowski, Twelver Shi'ite Islam: Conceptual and Practical Aspects (Singapor: 
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2006). 
7 Juan Cole, ‘The United States and Shi'ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba'thist Iraq’, The Middle 
East Journal 57, no. 4 (2003): 543–66. 
8 Haider A. Hamoudi, ‘Between Realism and Resistance: Shi’i Islam and the Contemporary 
Liberal State’, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture 11 no. 2 (2009): 107–20. 
9 Ernesto H. Braam, ‘All Roads Lead to Najaf: Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani’s Quiet Impact on 
Iraq’s 2010 Ballot and Its Aftermath’, Journal of International and Global Studies 2 no. 1 (2011): 
1–21. 
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Khomeini.10 In a further modification of this dichotomy, Haider Hamoudi has suggested 
four distinctive Shi’i doctrinal categories: Islamism, quietism, semi-quietism and 
ambiguous liberalism.11 In his view, Islamist or activist Shi’i mujtahids are those who 
propagate the idea of the ‘Guardianship of the Jurist’, Wilayat al-Faqih; they believe that 
the government desired by God involves a state ruled by Shi’i mujtahids on the basis of 
their interpretations of Sharia (Khomeini and Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr [1935-1980] 
were two leading advocates of this view). The quietist Shi’i mujtahids, according to 
Hamoudi, deliberately avoid any sort of interference in politics as, for example Ayatollah 
Khoei. Semi-quietist Shi’i quietists are those who fit between the Islamists and quietists; 
as they prefer to choose a more ambiguous position in terms of their political 
involvement, these semi-quietists neither pursue the establishment of the Shi’i state nor 
do they absent themselves from the political scene (Ali Sistani is an example). Finally, 
ambiguous liberal Shi’i quietists, such as Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935-2010) in 
Lebanon, believe in a sort of religio-political pluralism that promises a secure co-
existence even with non-Muslims ‘with whom there are disagreements’ as part of ‘a 
Muslim’s cultural and human responsibility’.12 
A second school accept that there are different levels of political inclusion for the 
Shi’i quietist throughout the abode of Islam—from Pakistan to North Africa, with Iran 
and Iraq at its heart— and they consider the impact of different contexts when analysing 
activism and quietism in, for instance the contexts of the 1979 Iran Revolution and post-
Saddam Iraq. The proponents of this school, Jelle Puelings for example, advised policy 
makers to include Shi’i mujtahids as one of the main influencers in Middle East politics 
                                                 
10 Some add a third category, the ‘whispering jurisprudent’, to this understanding of Shi’i political 
doctrines. See Ibid., 14.  
11 Hamoudi, ‘Between Realism and Resistance’, 111. 
12 Ibid., 118. 
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as they ‘can and will play a role in the socio-political developments of their community, 
even if they are known as being quietist’.13 Some observers have also dismissed the view 
of the renowned orthodox Shi’i centre, Najaf Seminary, as a politically quiet institution. 
This, they argue, led wrongly to the belief that the seemingly quiet, or reticent, mujtahids 
of Najaf are apolitical. They go further and note that the role of the Ayatollah Sistani in 
his second phase of political life since 2003 is a clear indication that the mujtahids, 
regardless of the political posture they assume from time to time, should not be 
overlooked in future strategic developments in the Middle East.14  
A third school comprises those who do not define a distinction between Shi’i 
activism and quietism. Proponents of this school believe that Shi’i Islam is, in its very 
essence, political and if some clerics seem more active than others, it is solely a matter of 
the context in which they operate.15 Reviewing history, they conclude that whenever 
conditions permit, mujtahids have been activist. They suggest that, even if there were a 
distinction between Shi’i quietism and activism, it is quite nebulous and that 
distinguishing two different factions within Shi’i Islam is a complicated task. 16 
Developing this interpretation, Abdulaziz Sachedina observes that 
 
[w]hat is primary is to understand quietism in relation to its supposed contrary: 
activism. Both respond to the existence of injustice in the Muslim polity; both are 
seen as part of the long-term attempt to establish a just polity in historical time; 
and both are sanctioned in religious texts. However, the exponents of the quietist 
posture have often, in practice, been supporters of authoritarian politics and have 
                                                 
13 Jelle Puelings, ‘Fearing a “Shiite Octopus”. Sunni – Shi'a Relations and the Implications for 
Belgium and Europe’, Egmont Paper no. 35 (2010): 40. 
14 Søren Schmidt, ‘The Role of Religion in Politics: The Case of Shia-Islamism in Iraq’, Nordic 
Journal of Religion and Society 22, no. 2) (2009): 123–43. 
15 Graham E. Fuller and Rend R. Francke, ‘Is Shi'ism Radical?’, Middle East Quarterly (March 
2000): 11–20, http://www.meforum.org/35/is-Shiʿism-radical (accessed  March 22, 2012); Reidar 
Visser, ‘Sistani, the United States and Politics in Iraq: From Quietism to Machiavellianism?’, 
NUPI Paper 700 (2006) 
16 Jacob Lassner, ‘Whither Shi'ite Islam? Authenticating a Shi'ite Future Based on Reading the 
Islamic Past’, Bustan: The Middle East Book Review 1, no. 1 (2010): 3–19. 
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offered unquestioning and immediate obedience to almost any Muslim authority 
that publicly adhered to the Sharia.17  
 
Therefore, according to this school, the distinction between quietism and activism is not 
fundamental, as both factions seek to protect the community from external threats. They 
argue that mujtahids may take different approaches, sometimes moderate and sometimes 
more radical, consistent with the contexts they face. Like two common Shi’i practices, 
namely ‘taqiyyah’18 and ‘martyrdom’, it seems that quietism and activism are two sides 
of the same coin. While advocates of quietism seek to find the safest way through the 
Occultation Era, their activist counterparts take a more extroverted approach to preserve 
the faith in the face of external threats.   
The last school of thought goes a step further in defining quietism and activism. 
It presents a series of historical events to prove that when faced with different contexts, a 
Shi’i mujtahid could act as a quietist, but when the situation changes, he may become an 
activist. Hence, it questions the very existence of two identifiable factions or doctrines 
within Shi’ism. Instead, this school explains differences among clerics with reference to 
their personal characteristics.19  
A review of these four schools indicates that defining two poles within Shi’ism is 
more likely to obscure than illuminate political dimensions of the faith. First, in contrast 
to mainstream Sunni Islam, the gate of ijtihad in Shi’ism—the right of personal reasoning 
and perception for a mujtahid — has been open since the early history of the faith.20 To 
underpin the internal dynamism within Shi’ism and its seemingly quietistic and/or activist 
                                                 
17 Abdulaziz Sachedina, ‘Prudential Concealment in Shi'ite Islam: A Strategy of Survival or a 
Principle?’, Common Knowledge 16, no. 2 (2010): 237. 
18 In Islamic lexicon, ‘taqiyyah’ means and act of precautionary dissimulation of the faith as a 
reaction to a hostile threat. See Ibid.   
19 Rahimi, Babak. 2008. The Discourse of Democracy in Shi‘i Islamic Jurisprudence: The Two 
Cases of Montazeri and Sistani. European University Institute.; Sachedina, ‘Prudential 
Concealment in Shi'ite Islam’, 237. 
20 Wael Hallaq, ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 
16, no. 1 (1984): 3–41. 
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postures by the clergy, it is necessary to note that mujtahids must rely on their personal 
perceptions when confronted with different circumstances; it seems, therefore, that for 
example, some researchers have confused the theory of the Guardianship of the Jurist. 
The majority of Shi’i mujtahids have to varying degrees believed in the theory of 
Guardianship of the Jurist.21 While some mujtahids believe in a restricted version of the 
theory, others extend this guardianship to the right of establishing an Islamic government. 
Therefore, to assume that the Guardianship of the Jurist is a radical Shi’i political theory 
propagated by activist clerics like Khomeini and Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr is inaccurate, 
as it does not reflect correctly on the practice of mainstream mujtahids throughout the 
history.   
Second, dichotomous models such as quietism, activism, Islamism, and semi-
quietism in Shi’i Islam are confusing. They cannot serve as a heuristic to analyse given 
situations. To give an example, different studies, using different approaches, have 
characterised the prominent Shi’i mujtahid, Ayatollah Sistani, as quietist, a semi-quietist, 
or an active Machiavellian. 22  Clearly, categorising mujtahids as quiet and active is 
arbitrary. Those who seek to draw a sharp line between these political tendencies have 
failed to provide a robust rationale or basis for doing so. Thus, applying different labels 
                                                 
21  Almost all Shi’i usuli mujtahids, the subject of this study, subscribe to the principles of 
Guardianship of the Jurist. While some established figures, like Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-
1989), advocates the absolutist camp other figures like Ayatollah Khoei (1899-1992) behold a 
delimited version of the guardianship of the jurist. The absolute guardianship of jurist theory 
entails that the fully-qualified Shi’i jurist, mujtahid jami’al-sharayit, has the exact rights and 
guardianship of that of the prophet and infallible Imams in leading and ruling the community 
during the occultation era. At the other side of the spectrum lies the mainstream guardianship of 
jurist that reserves for Shi’i jurists an exclusive responsibility to undertake non-litigious affairs, 
those which social order is linked with. For further clarifications on the theory and its different 
interpretations see Abdulaziz Sachedina, 'The Rule of the Religious Jurist in Iran', in Iran at the 
Crossroads, eds. John L. Esposito and R. K. Ramazani (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001): 
123-147; Hamid Mavani, 'Ayatullah Khomeini's Concept of Governance (Wilayat Al-Faqih) and 
the Classical Shi ‘I Doctrine of Imamate', Middle Eastern Studies 47, no. 5 (2011): 807-24. For 
Ayatollah Khoei’s viewpoint on the theory seeAbu al-Qasim Khoei, Minhaj Al-Salihin (Beirut: 
Madinat al-Ilm, 1989): Vol 1, 365-366. 
22 Visser, ‘Sistani, the United States and Politics’.  
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to mujtahids is unhelpful and only causes further confusion in attempts to understand 
political Shi’ism.  
Third, various mujtahids’ personalities and their approaches to varying political 
situations in the modern era have contributed to this simplistic dichotomisation used by 
researchers. It is worth noting that a mujtahid may act differently depending on the 
circumstances in which he finds himself. The opposition of Ayatollah Khomeini to the 
Pahlavi monarchy does not indicate that Shi’i Islam is radical; the quietism of Ayatollah 
Khoei in the face of Iraq’s regime and Saddam’s tyranny, does not indicate that the faith 
is apolitical. However, studies have advanced widely different and often misleading 
understandings of the merely apparent dissimilar political practices of Shi’i mujtahids in 
the contemporary Middle East. 
This confusion suggests the need for a more nuanced analysis of Shi’i mujtahids 
as political actors in the region. What is needed is a new methodology for studying high-
ranking Shi’i ulama. Only a handful of studies of the Shi’i political ascendancy in the 
Middle East have explored the role and perceptions of clerics who engage in politics; and 
few of these have employed interviews in order to understand the perceptions that led to 
this clerical engagement. The next section addresses this gap by triangulating secondary 
data with data gathered through interviews with Shi’i high-ranking clerics and their close 
affiliates in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, and with historical archives, and clerics’ 
manifestos.23 It focuses on three cases of Shi’i clerical elite political engagement in the 
contemporary Middle East -- three examples of transformative events in which the Shi’i 
                                                 
23 The pool of interviewees range from elite informants (e.g. teachers of Shi’i seminaries, and 
local politicians) to prominent individuals at the forefront of contemporary Middle Eastern 
politics (e.g. the Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf, and former President Hashemi Rafsanjani of 
Iran). Further elaboration of these interviews and their implications for understanding Shi’i 
clerical elite politics is in Mohammad Kalantari, The Clergy and the Modern Middle East: Shiʿi 
Political Activism in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, Royal Asiatic Society, forthcoming 2019.  
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mujtahids played an important political role. These cases allow us to explore both the 
political opportunity structures that mujtahids confronted at specific times and places, and 
how the perception (ijtihad) of high-ranking Shi’i ulama led to their taking an activist 
political stance in response to unfolding circumstances.  
 
Political Activism and opportunity structure  
Mujtahids, with their authority to interpret the faith’s principles and within the 
contingencies offered by varying contexts, claim to preserve the integrity of the Shi’i 
community by taking a more contentious posture. They believe that sovereign power over 
humanity belongs to God, who asserts this through His Prophet and the twelve infallible 
imams. They posit that during the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam, the duty of mujtahids 
is to lead and safeguard the integrity of the community. 24  It is their responsibility, 
according to Shi’i doctrine, to protect the ‘citadel of the faith’25 and to engage in a vigilant 
process of ijtihad.26  
Therefore, when mujtahids perceive a threat to the community and a permissible 
context for protecting the community against it, they ask for the active involvement of 
religious authorities and attempt to mobilise followers. They believe that to preserve the 
citadel of the faith, Shi’is should be obliged to undertake broader social responsibilities, 
including resisting threats to the community. At the same time, they reserve for the 
                                                 
24 It is believed that when the twelfth imam was serving his minor occultation (873–941), a Shi’i 
laity wrote a letter to him asking for his guidance concerning a series of issues that had arisen for 
his followers. In response, a deputy of the Imam provided a signed script, tawqi, stating, ‘[a]s for 
the events which may occur in future, refer to the transmitter (ruwat) of our traditions (hadith); 
who are my proof (Hujjat) to you, and I am the proof of Allah to you all’. Saduq, Kamal al-Din 
wa Tamam al-Ne'mah, Vol. II: 483. 
25 Citadel of Islam, in Islamic jurisprudence, means the ‘Muslim community’ and the ‘essence of 
Islam’. In Usuli Shi’ism, mujtahids are believed to be the protectors of the citadel of Islam. See 
Mirza Qummi, Jami' al-Shattat (Tehran: Kayhan, 1992), Vol I, 376. 
26 The Shi’i doctrine entails that those mujtahids qualified to serve as ‘transmitters of the imams’ 
hadiths’, have the divine responsibility and authority to exercise ijtihad. See Saduq, Kamal al-
Din wa Tamam al-Ne'mah.  
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general deputies of the Imam, the mujtahids, the role of leadership during the absence of 
the Imam.  
To understand when a mujtahid is more inclined to holding a politically active 
posture and engage in contentious politics, it is necessary to address the political context. 
Context here is defined as the specific objective political opportunities structure coupled 
with a mujtahid’s interpretation of that structure.  
The concept of the ‘political opportunity structure’ (POS) furnishes the grounding 
from which to explain and sometimes predict the ‘periodicity, style, and content of 
activist claims’ within a political context.27 It provides a ‘consistent but not necessarily 
formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage 
or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements’.28 Although 
social movement theorists may not necessarily have a common understanding of a POS, 
they tend to focus on determining the extent to which such structures are open and/or 
closed, and their institutional and substantive location.29 An ‘open opportunity structure’ 
encourages political actors to engage in collective actions and form a social movement; 
while a ‘closed opportunity structure’ impedes the emergence of contentious politics. 
While different dimensions of political opportunity structures have been the focus of the 
social movements literature, it appears that the recognition of an open/closed structure is 
crucial in the formation of social movements. 
                                                 
27 David S. Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff, ‘Conceptualizing Political Opportunity’, Social Forces 
82, no. 4 (2004): 1457–92. 
28 Sidney Tarrow, ‘States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements’, in 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, 
and Cultural Framings, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 54. 
29 William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, 'Framing Political Opportunity', in Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural 
Framings, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 277.   
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In fact, the concept of POS has been criticised on the grounds that scholars tend 
to emphasise objective political opportunities without any reference to perception. The 
overall argument is that an opportunity is only an opportunity if it is perceived to be one 
by an agent. 30  Prior to undertaking mobilisation, political actors must perceive 
opportunity structures to be open, although their interpretation ‘will not always mirror 
reality’.31  
How mujtahids, as political actors, perceive an opportunity, stems from their 
ijtihad. Ijtihad is the maximum ‘exertion of mental energy’ by a mujtahid, to search for 
and apply the faith’s principles to discover the divine law applicable to a given 
circumstance.32 A mujtahid’s actions, opinions, and assumed political postures are rooted 
in his interpretation of the situation he is facing in light of the Shi’i principles. A mujtahid, 
as the title implies, acts and lives based on his ijtihad. Hence, ijtihad is determinative in 
his political positioning in response to a given circumstance.  
Whether mujtahids adopt an activist or relatively quietist political postures depend 
on their interpretation of given (objective) political opportunity structure. The ‘political 
context’ for Shi’i mujtahids’ activism is, therefore, defined as the interaction of an 
objective POS and the perception of the mujtahid of that structure. The different postures 
taken by mujtahids in different contexts can be shown to be attributable not to doctrinal 
differences but, at least in part, to the actors’ different perception of the POS at the time. 
Thus, a mujtahid’s seemingly quietist posture in a given context may, in fact, represent 
                                                 
30  Doowon Suh, ‘How Do Political Opportunities Matter for Social Movements? Political 
Opportunity, Misframing, Pseudosuccess, and Pseudofailure’, The Sociological Quarterly 42, no. 
3 (2001): 437–60. 
31 Lee A. Banaszak, Why Movements Succeed or Fail: Opportunity, Culture, and the Struggle for 
Woman Suffrage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 31.  
32 Hallaq, ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?’.  
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the utmost political activism possible at a time and place and even be part of a trend of 
activist political strategy.33  
In general, a decision by the mujtahids to assume an activist political posture 
depends on the political context: (1) the multi-levelled political opportunity structure 
which focuses on the ability of the Shi’i mujtahids to mobilise their followers and (2) 
their perception of that structure. If the context is permissive, the mujtahid may be more 
likely to become actively engaged in politics to fulfil his divine responsibility vis-à-vis 
the community; in restrictive contexts, he would more likely remain politically quiet (see 
Figure 1). 
Reviewing Shi’i history through the lens of this framework provides a means of 
understanding Shi’i mujtahids’ tactical political practices under what has been labelled 
by researchers as ‘quietism’ and ‘activism’. Mujtahids, as with any other political actors, 
might perceive a POS as being open or closed, or the context to be either permissive or 
restrictive. Accordingly, whenever he perceives an open structure, he is more likely to 
engage in politics by giving legal opinions or engaging in legal arbitration, either 
individually or through an alliance with other mujtahids. Some argue that there is the 
possibility of a mismatch between the objective and perceived political opportunity 
structures and believed that as political opportunities are subjective, actors may either fail 
                                                 
33 A case in point is that of Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s seemingly quiet posture while he served as the 
leader of Qom Seminary. He preferred to deal in private with the state apparatus and 
Mohammadreza Shah in order to advance his goals and fulfil his socio-political responsibilities 
vis-à-vis the community. Therefore, while he was the main force behind suspending the Shah’s 
social reforms in the late 1950s through covert political bargaining with the state, in the eyes’ of 
public he remained a politically quiet mujtahid. For a detailed notes on Boroujerdi and Shah 
Relations see  Mohammad Ghochani, ‘Zendegi Siasi –e Ayatollah Boroujerdi: Shah wa Faqih’, 
Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi Portal, (January 2004), http://www.broujerdi.ir/index.php/2016-03-
25-16-38-40/2016-03-25-16-40-41/392-2016-03-26-07-10-30 (accessed July 21, 2014).  
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to perceive opportunities which might objectively exist, or perceive opportunities where 
none exist.34  
 
 
In sum, as with any other political actor, mujtahids cannot seize a political opportunity 
unless they perceive there to be an opportunity: Thus, four distinctive outcomes may be 
identified.  
(1) If the opportunity structure is relatively closed and mujtahids perceive it 
accurately, they remain quiet; 
(2) If the opportunity structure is relatively closed and they misperceive it, they 
engage in activism, but will fail to mobilise a popular movement towards 
achieving their goals; 
                                                 
34 Charles Kurzman, ‘Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement 
Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979’, American Sociological Review 61, no. 1 (1996): 153-
170. 
15 
 
(3) If there is a relatively open political opportunity and mujtahids misperceive it, 
accordingly they remain quiet and miss an opportunity; and  
(4) If the opportunity structure is relatively open and they have an accurate perception 
of it, they become active and lead a successful social mobilisation to fulfil their 
asserted goal, to protect the integrity of Shi’i community.  
 
All four potentialities have occurred and been practised by Shi’i mujtahids throughout 
history. The major Shi’i political trajectory from the commencement of the Occultation 
Era until the rise of Shi’i Safavid in Persia (from 941 to 1501 CE) represents an example 
of the first category. The mujtahids perceived accurately that the structural political 
opportunities for Shi’i activism were relatively closed, so they stayed out of politics and 
focused on developing and strengthening the foundations of the faith.  
 A notable case of the second category—a relatively closed opportunity structure 
and an inaccurate perception of the clergy—was the engagement of the Najafi mujtahids 
in the Persian Constitutional Revolution,35 in which an alliance between religious and 
secular elites from 1905 to 1911 constituted the leadership of the revolution. However, 
the course of events and the outcome of the revolution were by no means what the 
mujtahids had predicted. The execution of Sheikh Fadlallah Nuri as a result of a verdict 
by his fellow colleague was the first and most notorious of its kind in the history of 
Shi’ism and, along with other outcomes, clearly showed that the clergy had misperceived 
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the nature of the political opportunity structure.36 When the dust from the turmoil settled, 
they had lost a great deal of their legitimacy, a situation that continued for many decades.  
The 1991 Shi’i Uprising in Iraq is an example of the third category as it illustrates 
a circumstance in which the political opportunity structure was relatively open, yet the 
clerical leadership missed the opportunity because of their misperception of it. 
Overwhelmed by Saddam’s adventurous yet disastrous wars, the Shi’is and Kurds in Iraq 
orchestrated a popular uprising in March 1991 against his regime. The Shi’i mujtahids of 
Najaf, which had previously felt abandoned by their laity followers, misperceived the 
relatively open opportunity structure and delayed in becoming active—a misperception 
that was eventually seen to be one of the main reasons for the failure of the uprising and 
the subsequent government crackdown on revolutionaries in Iraq.37 
The current political ascendancy of Shi’i communities and mujtahids in the 
Middle East appears to be in line with the fourth category. This is linked to a situation in 
which the structural political opportunity has been open, and the clerical leadership has 
perceived it accurately and has succeeded in mobilising the masses towards the 
achievement of their goals. This ‘permissive’ context was instrumental in the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the rise of Shi’is in post-2003 Iraq 
and the Shi’i triumph in Lebanon in 2006. For their part, at an individual level, Khomeini, 
Sistani and Nasrallah accurately perceived the relevant opportunities at the time and 
seized them, to the benefit of their political movements. 
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Mujtahids, open opportunity structure, accurate perceptions, and permissive 
contexts 
The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran based on Khomeini’s political ijtihad 
represented the most salient example and culmination of the practice of Shi’i activism in 
the modern history of the Middle East. Born and raised in Iran, the Ayatollah’s early life 
was concurrent with the rise of the Pahlavi Dynasty. At the same time, in the early 1920s, 
the Shi’i Seminary was founded in Qom by Ayatollah Abd al-Karim Haeri Yazdi (1859–
1937). Despite some scattered opposition to the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925-1941), 
most mujtahids in Iran, striving to institutionalise the new-born seminary, chose to stay 
out of politics. 38  However, when Reza Shah stepped down for his young son 
Mohammadreza, the Seminary had already passed through its foundation stage and some 
years later, had become even more formidable under the leadership of Ayatollah 
Boroujerdi (1875–1961). Under his leadership, the Qom Seminary became the main 
religious centre of the Shi’i world—a position that the Najaf Seminary had held for 
centuries.39 When Boroujerdi passed away, Mohammadreza Shah initiated a series of 
socio-economic reforms. Known as the ‘White Revolution’, these reforms led to a hostile 
encounter between the state and the clergy, and most notably Khomeini.40 The criticism 
of the mujtahids became so caustic that the government banished the Ayatollah from the 
country. He later settled in Najaf, and it was there that he developed the doctrine that 
formed the basis of the Islamic government of Iran. His fellow followers in Iran were 
simultaneously endeavouring to change the political opportunity structure by forging the 
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39 Ibid., 91. 
40 Mohsen, Milani, The making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: from Monarchy to Islamic 
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18 
 
foundations of an underground movement using a simple but effective medium, the 
Mosques’ pulpits.41 
During the 1970s, Khomeini started lecturing on his ideas about the Islamic 
government as well as his take on the Guardianship of the Jurist theory. His perception 
at the time was that Shi’i politics during the Occultation should be based on the rule of 
Islam; therefore, a mujtahid, in a permissive context, should be able to establish a 
government to prevent any dilution of Islamic teachings. An open opportunity structure 
existed in the wake of February 1979, which he perceived accurately and seized it, in 
order to pursue his political goal.  
Some decades later, and under the influence of the 1979 Revolution of Iran and 
the abolition of the Baath government of Saddam, a Shi’i government took power in Iraq. 
The objective political opportunity structure in post-2003 Iraq was somewhat different to 
that which existed in Iran on the eve of its revolution. Although the Shi’i community 
constituted the majority of the population, it had existed under Sunni supremacy since the 
creation of the country in the early 1920s. The fall of the Baathists in Iraq offered the 
clerical leadership an opportunity to safeguard the rights of the community. As a first 
step, Sistani insisted on a ‘one-man-one-vote’ standard for the 2005 election and asked 
Iraqi Shi’is to participate. He pragmatically sought a way for the Shi’i community to make 
the most of its numerical majority in Iraq. 42  Perceiving the POS to be relatively 
favourable, the Ayatollah became active in politics—albeit with some reservations as he 
was of Iranian descent—and sought to strengthen and protect the community at that 
critical moment. Seyyed Mohammadreza Sistani, the eldest son of the Ayatollah and his 
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aide, implied that the endeavours of his father were mainly focused on lobbying elected 
members of the Provisional Assembly to prevent the ratification of ‘anti-sharia laws’ in 
the new Iraqi constitution.43 As the clerical leadership in Iraq had been witness to the 
experiences of its colleagues in Iran over the previous three decades, this was the reason 
for the seeming divergence of views between Khomeini and Sistani, two of the most 
distinguished Shi’i mujtahids of their times. Eventually, the pragmatism pursued by 
Sistani rewarded the Shi’i community and its religious leadership in Iraq with the highest 
level of Shi’i authority since the birth of the country.44  
Since 2005, the clerical leadership in Iraq, though not directly active in mundane 
executive political affairs, has been the source of state legitimacy to which most people 
have referred. In a handful of cases, and whenever requested, Sistani and his entourage 
in Iraq have issued rulings or mediated conflicts between different parties to stabilise the 
country’s internal and foreign affairs. However, perhaps the most significant move in 
post-2003 Iraq was made on the eve of the fall of Mosul to the Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant, in June 2014. In the most exceptional political act in almost a century of Shi’i 
history, Sistani issued the ‘fatwa of jihad’, calling on all Iraqis, Shi’is and non-Shi’is ‘to 
defend the country, its people, the honour of its citizens, and its sacred places’.45 The 
fatwa represented the greatest degree of political activism that has ever been exhibited by 
a Shi’i mujtahid residing in Iraq. The irony, however, is that it came from the Ayatollah 
who was believed by a majority of analysts to be the most famous advocate of political 
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quietism among the Shi’i clergy.46 The political postures taken by Sistani over the course 
of the last fifteen years clearly indicate that he becomes engaged in politics when, in the 
context of an open POS, he perceives a threat to the Shi’i community, especially when it 
is imposed by outsiders. His millions of followers, Iraqi politicians and other regional 
players regard him as the most influential religious leader in Iraq.47 
Shi’i activism in Lebanon also has unique characteristics compared with Iran and 
Iraq. Interestingly, the Shi’is in Lebanon had succeeded in establishing judicial court 
dedicated to their sect before their coreligionists in Iran and Iraq. The establishment of 
the Ja’fari court in 1926, in a sense, has been propulsed the Shi’i identity in Lebanon.48 
Because of the relatively closed objective structural opportunity in the country, and the 
confessional nature of Lebanese politics, the Shi’i mujtahids in Lebanon engaged in 
politics simply to protect the very existence of their followers. It took Imam Musa Sadr, 
the founder of clerical activism in contemporary Lebanon, more than fifteen years to form 
the Deprived Movement – the father of Amal Party- in 1974. The charter of the movement 
indicated that it was formed to protect deprived Lebanese communities (Shi’is and 
others), which, at the time, were entangled geographically between the hostilities of the 
Palestinian refugees in the south and the Christian Maronites of northern Lebanon.49  
Later, with the commencement of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 and the 
constant threats from Israel, Shi’i mujtahids moved further towards assuming an activist 
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posture. Musa Sadr’s inheritors did the same; most notably, the formation of Hezbollah 
around a handful of clerical figures was in direct response to the threats of Israeli 
occupation in post-1982 Lebanon. 50  Although during its early years the clerical 
leadership of Hezbollah asked for the establishment of an Islamic state, with the 
emergence of a new charismatic leadership, they later moderated their posture to be 
consistent with the realities of the country’s political structure.51  
Shi’i political history over the last 40 years suggests that a new paradigm has 
emerged in modern Middle East based on the central role of the mujtahids’ leadership. 
The cases of Iran 1979, Iraq 2003 and Lebanon 2006 provide a basis for analysing this 
political paradigm through the prism of a clerical elite network, which has been formed 
by individual Shi’i mujtahids, their perceptions of the POS, and the political contexts in 
the region.  
These three cases imply successful Shi’i political movements through the accurate 
assessment of the perceived POSs in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. Nevertheless, the similarities 
and differences between the Shi’i mujtahids’ political postures in modern Iran, Iraq and 
Lebanon are attributable not to sharply different interpretations of Shi’i principles or 
different versions of Shi’ism but to the similarities and differences in the objective POSs 
that they face. ‘Activism’ and ‘quietism’, therefore, should be understood not as 
representing a strategic or doctrinal divide in Shi’ism but only as tactical political postures 
that vary according to the context. 
The figure above shows objective POS, may pose different levels in their 
systematic analysis in international relations. The structure a Shi’i mujtahid faces, in a 
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specific context, influences and be influenced by opportunity structures in other contexts. 
Therefore, the objective POSs relevant to Iran, Iraq and Lebanon exhibited both recurrent 
and unique factors. 
At the international level, the POS overlapped for the Shi’i communities in the 
Middle East. Until the early 1990s, Shi’i mujtahids faced threats arising from the Cold 
War as the US–Soviet rivalry represented the potential threat of a non-Muslim conquest 
of the Muslim world. While Iran was inclined towards the Western camp for the most of 
its pre-Revolution era, the Republic of Iraq tended towards the East and Lebanon 
vacillated between the two camps.52 The Shi’i mujtahids tried to preserve their popular 
constituency from both influences of anti-religious communism and the religious laxity 
and secularism introduced by western liberalism. To this end, some mujtahids succeeded, 
and others failed to mitigate the threats to their communities.  
A case in point at the regional level, is the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 
the aftermath of WWI that changed the political structures in Iraq and Lebanon and 
influenced those in Iran.53 The rise of Iraqi Republic in 1958, the civil war in Lebanon 
and, most significantly, the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran impacted the 
regional level as well as the POSs of neighbouring countries.54 One impact of these 
regional upheavals was the development of a sense of religious transnationalism among 
Shi’i communities in the Middle East. A case in point is the popular uprising in 1963 in 
Iran, which ignited harsh response from the leadership of the Najaf Seminary in Iraq, 55  
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as did the devastating Lebanon Civil War from 1975 to 1990.56 Religious leaders in Iran 
opposed the atrocities of the Baath regime against the Shi’i community in Iraq (1968–
2003),57 and condemned the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the 1980s.58  
An important element of POS at the national level could be seen in the attitude of 
the state towards the Shi’i religious community. The rise of Reza Shah in Iran became 
concurrent with the pressure on clerical establishments in Iran. 59  Although some 
restrictions against the clergy were lifted during the early stages of Mohammadreza 
Pahlavi’s reign, for various reasons, mujtahids were the main target of sanctions by his 
regime during the second half of his rule.60 In Lebanon, however, due to the weakness of 
the state, the Shi’is were faced with a more open POS at national level.61 The situation 
was the worst for the Shi’is in Iraq. The rise of the Baath regime in Iraq in 1968 heralded 
the most severely repressive era for the Shi’i community and for its mujtahids settled in 
the holy cities. The state did not tolerate even a semblance of activism from the clergy 
and responded harshly to such insurrections.62 Over the course of the two decades that 
ended with Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Shi’i mujtahids in Iraq faced a closed 
POS, mainly because of the state repression.  
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Political opportunity structures also vary in these three countries at societal level. 
The Shi’is in Iraq became a majority population of the country during the process of 
conversion by Sunnite tribesmen to Shi’i Islam in the early twentieth century. 63 
Therefore, the traces of strong Arab and nomadic ties should not be underestimated when 
studying the Shi’is in Iraq.64 Some Iraqi tribes still have both Sunni and Shi’i members, 
both of whom show relatively strong patronage to their tribal values and sheikhs. Shi’i 
mujtahids in Iraq have always faced a dilemma as how to respond to this tribalism when 
undertaking their socio-political responsibilities. Therefore, they are less likely to engage 
in politics or, if they become active, expect less successful outcome unless they have the 
support of the tribal chiefs. This can also have been seen in Lebanon through the lens of 
sectarianism as Lebanese identity tends to be constructed along sectarian lines. Therefore, 
the main concern of the Shi’i mujtahids in Lebanon is to evaluate the consequences of 
their actions in line with the 16 other religious sects in the country. Nevertheless, the 
sectarianism of Lebanon’s society has enabled mujtahids to form a strong relationship 
with the laity followers.65  
Finally, the POS for Shi’i activism on an individual level has been relatively 
dependent on a handful of charismatic leaders, high-ranking mujtahids, who have been 
active in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon during the modern era. As leaders of their relevant 
communities, each of these figures has sought to seize the opportunity when available to 
pursue their socio-political roles and responsibilities. Faced with different objective 
political opportunities on broader levels, these figures have contributed to the structure 
on an individual level through their ijtihad and other activities. The ijtihad of Khomeini 
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in the 1970s, which outlined the role of mujtahids as participants in political affairs, was 
not only crystallised as a response to the structure he perceived at the time, but also 
changed the objective POS for his colleagues and followers and further developed 
opposition to the regime of the Shah in Iran. This was like the role played by Musa Sadr 
in revitalising the Shi’i community in Lebanon. In contrast, the ijtihad of Khoei, 
influenced by his interpretation of what was a relatively closed POS in Iraq during 1980s, 
pushed him towards assuming a quietist posture and, hence, further closed the political 
opportunity structure for other mujtahids in Iraq for years to come.66  
Evaluating the objective POSs at different levels further explains the rationale 
behind the postures of different Shi’i mujtahids in contemporary politics of Iran, Iraq and 
Lebanon. The course of events that led to the current Shi’i revival in the Middle East has 
been mainly influenced by the contextual changes which have occurred in recent years 
and, consequently, provided a relatively more open political opportunity structure for 
clerical activism.  
 
Conclusion 
Since the early 1970s, the concept of the ‘political opportunity structure’ has been the 
focus of the study of social movements and contentious politics. Only recently, however, 
have researchers begun to recognise the significance of actors’ perceptions of objective 
conditions. Perceptions, accurate or otherwise, are important in the formation of 
contentious politics.  
The previous section showed how mujtahids manoeuvred and positioned 
themselves in response to the socio-political upheavals they faced and how they broadcast 
their opinions. Some scholars have suggested that the Shi’i clerical authority in the 
contemporary era has been mitigated by the activities and novel opinions of a group of 
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Muslim intelligentsias and that the gap has ‘widened between clerics and laymen’.67 
Nevertheless, the mainstream structure of the Shi’i clergy, which comprises people who 
believe in ijtihad as a means of responding to developments, still, and perhaps for the 
foreseeable future, remains of utmost importance in understanding Shi’i politics in 
today’s Middle East.  
Reviewing the trajectory of their political activism since the early twentieth 
century, it could be concluded that when it comes to the protection of the community 
from external threats, Shi’i mujtahids form powerful associations, either by engaging in 
activism or by supporting their active colleagues. In a post-9/11 world and with the rise 
of extremist groups that constantly threaten the regional order, it has become clear that 
perhaps the greatest threat to stability in the region is the set of doctrines that are embraced 
by radicalised groups in the region. Today, the active Shi’i leadership in Iran, Iraq and 
Lebanon seem to have coherent pragmatic policies that comply with the norms of the 
international community.  
It has been suggested that categorising the members of high-ranking Shi’i 
mujtahids as either apolitical quietists or extreme activists obscures the realpolitik that is 
common to all of them. Shi’i mujtahids are always potentially active because of the 
varying political contexts which arise in the Middle East; further, the core foundations of 
the faith have been constructed around politics. Above all, in times of threat, whenever 
they perceive a relatively open political opportunity structure, Shi’i mujtahids would 
orchestrate contentious politics. To this end, especially in modern times, they may go 
beyond the exclusive domain of divine politics and engage in more pragmatic politics.68 
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To fulfil their responsibilities as the heirs to the Prophet and infallible Imams,69 they form 
alliances with a specific social class against common threats and might even collude with 
autocratic state rulers with the sole purpose of protecting the Shi’i community from the 
threat of the deprivation of an infallible source of leadership. Recognising this is a crucial 
step towards understanding Shi’i elite politics in the region today and how these politics 
might shape the future.  
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